Tide turns against globalization

Thanks to Ben and Tariq for their provocative posts. My first real crack at this blogging thing will concern a topic that I follow closely (globalization) and should, in a roundabout way, connect with some of the ideas in previous posts.

Before all that, I want to express my sadness over the tragic collapse of the I35 bridge in Minneapolis. I grew up in the Minneapolis area, and my better half spent significant time in the area, so this tragedy resonates with us. I've driven over that bridge hundreds of times in my life. It's a city that I love dearly. Our thoughts and prayers go out to the families affected. Hang in there, Minneapolis.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2a735dd0-3873-11dc-bca9-0000779fd2ac.html
One of the leitmotifs of the globalization debate in the past few years has been the negative impact of globalization - conceived here as increasing trade, foreign investment, financial flows, and immigration - on the middle class in rich democracies. What's really new about this debate, outlined clearly in a recent Foreign Affairs article by Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter, is the implication that middle income earners - usually thought to be natural supporters of globalization - might provide the underpinning for a large-scale anti-globalization political movement. That low income earners would resist increasing openness is not surprising - the Stolper-Samuelson theory formulated in the 1940s predicts that the returns to low-wage labor, which is relatively scarce in rich countries, will decline, while the returns to the poor in labor-abundant poor countries should increase. The hollowing-out effect of modern globalization, in terms of squeezing the middle class, seems to have taken many by surprise.
That the middle class might not see globalization as an unalloyed good is not really surprising, and it probably doesn't reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the costs and benefits of globalization. The middle class faces a tough economic environment: competition from producers in low- and middle-income countries has all but destroyed the manufacturing base in nearly every rich democracy. Displaced workers have ended up with substandard jobs in the service industry (McJobs in the Anglo countries), on the dole or in part-time, unofficial or otherwise irregular jobs in continetal Europe (while a small group of highly protected insiders guard the remaining industrial jobs), or in the state sector in Scandinavia (better than McJobs, but still limiting jobs in terms of productivity growth). The globalization of finance has contributed to overall economic volatility and seems to have enabled the wealthiest to multiply their earnings by many times. Middle-level management jobs in IT and financial services are being siphoned off by rapidly growing developing countries in South and East Asia and Eastern and Central Europe. Education doesn't even seem to be a panacea to stagnant wages: the only educational categories that have experienced wage growth in the past five years are professional degrees and PhDs - educational categories that make up less than 3 percent of the population of the United States
So here comes the newest public opinion polling results from the Financial Times (see the link above), and it confirms that very few voters in (some) rich countries think highly of globalization. In Britain, France, Spain, and the US, less than 20 percent of those polled have a positive view of globalization. The figure is higher for Germany (around 40 percent), and from Eurobarometer polling I know that the figure is significantly higher in Scandinavia (between 70 to 80 percent in Sweden and Finland).
This finding suggests two really interesting questions: (1) can globalization be saved? Do we need, as Scheve and Slaughter suggest, a new New Deal for the globalization era, and, if so, what might that look like in an era of financial integration?; (2) why so much variation in attitudes toward globalization across countries? I can think of a few preliminary hypotheses: welfare states in Northern Europe that accomodate and cushion the instability caused by greater openness; higher education achievement in pro-globalization countries (extending from research by Harvard's Michael Hiscox showing that attitudes toward trade are strongly influenced by education); the structure of the economy (perhaps larger and more competitive manufacturing sectors in the pro-globalization countries); the quality and content of political discourse in different countries...
I don't have good (or any, really) ideas about this issue, but it is certain to frame political debate in the rich democracies for the forseeable future. My hunch is that we do need a new New Deal, but that the constraints imposed by global capital prevents any unilateral efforts by countries to try a massive income redistribution (and a collective effort seems really, really unlikely). More likely is a downturn in integration marked by greater protection and economic nationalism.

Oh, one other thing (mainly for Tariq): I've been really disappointed by the state of "indie" rock music for a long time. Just a bunch of hyped shite out there. I've been on this mid-1990s gangsta rap thing for the past 6 months (just ask Kate). But I heard a band that makes me happy again, a band that reminds me why I love music: Los Campesinos! Stupid name, but very enthusiastic indie-pop. I hear a bit of the boy-girl singsongy Architecture in Helsinki with the twee-as-fuck mid-80s C86 scene (specifically Black Tambourine, Another Sunny Day, and 14 Iced Bears) mixed in. Check that shit out!
http://www.loscampesinos.com/stuff.php
Tariq, you know you love this.